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Arbitration
By THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky has at last entered the modem era of arbitration.'
The Commonwealth's emergence from the shadows of old com-
mon law precedent2 was heralded by a Kentucky Supreme Court
3
declaration of policy and the near-simultaneous passage of a
new state arbitration statute. 4 These reforms were intended to
more effectively accommodate and encourage arbitration as a
substitute for litigation.
Meanwhile, a series of recent decisions by the nation's high-
est Court reflect that body's determination to forge a heightened
role for arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 5 The
identification of the Act as a source of substantive arbitration
law and the expansion of federal concepts of "arbitrability"
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. 1974,
M. Arch. 1976, J.D. 1980, University of Illinois.
I
Arbitration is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to
an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for a decision
based upon the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitra-
tor. The parties agree in advance that the arbitrator's determination, the
award, will be accepted as final and binding upon them.
DomK ON COmERCIAL ARBrrATioN § 1.01, at I (G. Wilner ed. 1984) [hereinafter
referred to as Domeyc].
I The Sixth Circuit stated the common law rule in Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142
F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944): "It is the law in Kentucky that an agreement between the
parties to a contract to arbitrate all of the disputes thereafter to arise thereunder is
invalid and unenforceable ..... " See Kentucky Law Survey-Remedies, 67 Ky. L.J. 665,
666 (1978-79).
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carts Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
4 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 278 (enacting a version of the Uniform Arbitration Act,
codified at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.240 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as KRS]).
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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may be as significant to Kentucky practitioners as contemporary
developments in state law.
I. KENTUCKY ENTERS THE MODERN ERA OF ARBRATIOT
In Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp. ,6 the Supreme
Court of Kentucky expressly renounced the common law rule
that arbitration agreements are revocable and unenforceable.
This major policy statement clarified the Court's earlier holding
in Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp.7 Although Kodak
Mining, like Fite & Warmath, was decided under the provisions
of the United States Arbitration Act,8 the Court went out of its
way to make clear the legal status of arbitration agreements
under Kentucky law. 9 Shortly after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Kodak Mining, Kentucky became the twenty-
sixth state to enact a version of the Uniform Arbitration Act.'0
The statute is the first in Kentucky history to provide for en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes and to
establish a clear and comprehensive scheme for arbitration and
award."l
Both developments have been a long time in coming. To
understand fully the significance of these changes, one must
explore the common law roots of Kentucky arbitration law and
the modern legal trends that have encouraged widespread use of
arbitration in twentieth century America.
A. The Long Shadow of the Common Law Rule
Throughout history, formal judicial processes for dispute
resolution have been supplemented or supplanted by the custom
6 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
1 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977). The Court held that "the provisions of the U.S.
Arbitration Act of 1925 apply to actions brought in the courts of this state where the
purpose of the action is to enforce voluntary arbitration agreements in contracts evi-
dencing transactions in interstate commerce." Id. at 734.
8 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
9 See notes 46-53 infra and accompanying text.
10 KRS §§ 417.045-.240 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984).
" For a comprehensive discussion of prior Kentucky statutes governing arbitration
and award, see Goldman, A Proposed Arbitration Act for Kentucky, 22 ARB. J. 193,
208-09 (1967).
[Vol. 74
ARBITRATION
of submitting controversies to a third party "arbiter" for deci-
sion.' 2 Phoenician traders referred commercial differences to
arbitration;' 3 their medieval descendants put similar cases before
merchant tribunals that dispensed speedy justice according to
international trade law and custom.' 4 In later centuries, "arbi-
tration" commonly referred to a process by which conflicts were
resolved outside the courts through conciliation and com-
promise, a process hinging on the supervisory role of the impartial
arbiter.' I
The motivations for employing such extra-judicial mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution have not changed. Modern busi-
nessmen often prefer a system that provides commercial justice
quickly and economically to lengthy litigation, particularly when
justice will be dispensed by one or more of their peers.' 6 Like-
wise, parties may desire a private process that potentially affords
more flexibility in remedy-making than traditional legal and
equitable relief, especially if the disputants have a continuing
contractual relationship.17
Unfortunately, such desires have often been frustrated by a
common law tenet deeming arbitration agreements revocable.' 8
Although there is disagreement about the origin of the revoca-
bility doctrine, it is often said that the rule resulted from the
reluctance of courts of law to sanction any encroachment on
their own jurisdiction.' 9 Others suggest that the rule has its roots
not in judicial jealousy, but in the English courts' blind adher-
'" F. KELLOR, AMEmRCAN ARBITRATION 3 (1948).
" Id.
I. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND Tm LAW 1, 9 (1918).
' Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth Century England, 2
LAW & HisT. REv. 21 (1984). The modem counterpart of this conciliatory process is
mediation. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE REs-
OLUTION IN ACTION: A PROCEDURAL GuDE 9-10 (1984).
16 See generally S. LAzARus, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT, R.
HOLTON, P. MATTHEWS & G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BusINEss DisPuTES: THE POTENTIAL
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 35-66 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAZARus] (The role of
the businessman in the commercial arbitration process is examined through a discussion
of both individual experiences and survey results.).
" Id.
, See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
'9 See DoMiE, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 21-23 (At common law, an agreement to
arbitrate was revocable at will by either party at any time before the award was
rendered.).
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ence to a seventeenth century case precedent. 20 Whatever its
source, it is clear that the rule, commonly referred to as the
"ouster of jurisdiction" doctrine, did little to encourage arbitra-
tion.21 According to Kentucky common law, for example, an
agreement between the parties to a contract to arbitrate future
disputes arising under that contract was invalid and unenforce-
able, being antithetical to the jurisdiction of the courts and
therefore contrary to public policy.2 Even agreements to submit
existing disputes to arbitration could be abandoned by either
party at any time prior to the rendering of a final decision by
the arbitrator.23
In Kentucky, a succession of legislative measures concerning
arbitration afforded limited relief from the common law rule of
revocability. 4 The first of these, enacted in 1795, established
procedures for judicial enforcement of subpoenas and final de-
cisions issued by arbitrators. 25 Two years later, an act was passed
that provided for the binding judicial submission to arbitration
of certain controversies concerning improvements to realty.2 6 In
one form or another, statutory procedures for judicial submis-
sion of controversies to arbitration continued to be utilized even
after the passage in 1873 of a law establishing a mechanism for
submission of existing disputes to arbitration by private consen-
sual agreement. 27 In 1942, these procedures were combined in a
single statute governing arbitration and award.28 Unfortunately,
both the 1942 act and its predecessors failed to provide for the
enforceability of contract provisions requiring the parties to
submit to arbitration disputes arising under the contpact.
B. The Modern Era in Arbitration
The modern era in arbitration began in the commercial bas-
tion of New York with the enactment of a statute providing a
" Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 132, 138-44 (1934-35).
21 F. KELLOR, supra note 12, at 5-8.
2 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
" Kramer v. Gough, 220 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1949).
21 See generally Goldman, supra note 11.
25 Acts of Ky., Dec. 19, 1795.
26 Acts of Ky., Feb. 27, 1797, § 7.
27 Goldman, supra note 11, at 203-04.
11 Id. at 204.
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comprehensive, systematic framework for submission of disputes
to arbitration.29 The New York statute was the first of many
providing for the irrevocability of contractual agreements to
submit future disputes to arbitration. 0 Moreover, it set forth
procedures for staying court actions brought in contravention of
arbitration agreements and for compelling recalcitrant parties to
proceed to arbitration. 31 As later amended, it afforded broad
powers to arbitrators to consider evidence and effect remedies,
32
and limited the freedom of courts to review findings of fact or
conclusions of law underlying arbitral awards. 33 Finally, it spe-
cifically stated certain grounds for vacature or modification of
such awards by courts, and established time limits for challenges
on such grounds.
34
The New York statute served as the model for the United
States Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Federal
Arbitration Act),35 which provides for arbitration of disputes
associated with maritime transactions and contracts evidencing
transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce. 36 Because
of its broad scope, the Federal Arbitration Act has been widely
applied. 37 Although the Act has never been construed as creating
an independent jurisdictional ground for federal courts, it has
been recognized as a source of federal substantive law binding
on state as well as federal courts.
3
"' Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey,
1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 193, 194.
"Id.
1920 N.Y. LAWS ch. 275 §§ 2, 5.
N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW §§ 7506(c), 7507 (McKinney 1980).
" Id. § 7510.
' Id. § 7511.
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
' Id. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
31 See, e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Mihalis Angelos, 234 F.
Supp. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (a voluntary agreement to arbitrate contained in a
charter supercedes a bill of lading clause providing for application of Australian law);
Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay Corp., 637 S,W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1982)
(Where there is no independent federal jurisdiction, and arbitration clause satisfies
Federal Arbitration Act, parties must litigate their claims in state courts, but their rights
will be determined under the Act; parties may not make the Act inapplicable by providing
for arbitration under the laws of a particular state.).
" See notes 145-47 infra and accompanying text.
1985-861
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The passage and successful implementation of modern arbi-
tration statutes in New York and other commercial states led to
the drafting of a Uniform Arbitration Statute by the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.39 An improved ver-
sion of the Act was approved by the American Bar Association
House of Delegates in 1956. 40 This updated text has been adopted
in the majority of states.
Nurtured by such legislation, arbitration has evolved as a
popular means of resolving controversies relating to engineering
and construction contracts, sales agreements, corporate and part-
nership relations, individual employment matters, brokerage con-
tracts, real estate matters, medical malpractice claims and
insurance-related claims. 41 For many years, collective bargaining
agreements have provided for the arbitration of labor griev-
ances. 42
Like their medieval counterparts, a number of industry and
trade groups have developed rules and procedures for arbitration
of disputes between members of the trade as well as those
involving customer complaints. 43 For example, the New York
Stock Exchange and other security regulatory organizations have
established forums for arbitration of investor claims generated
by the activities of broker/dealers, thus avoiding litigation of
these controversies."
Arbitration is also encouraged by organizations such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), which administers ar-
bitration of a wide variety of commercial and labor disputes
through a network of regional offices. Most of the cases sub-
mitted to the AAA are initiated pursuant to a provision in the
disputants' contract requiring the parties to submit to arbitration
all disputes "arising under or relating to" their agreement. 4
11 DomxE, supra note 1, § 4.02, at 29-30.
40 Unif. Arbitration Act, 70 U.L.A. 1 (1985).
41 DomKE, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 3; LAZARUs, supra note 16, at 58.
42 See generally M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 10-25 (1981).
41 See generally Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COL. L. REv. 846
(1961).
4 See generally Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 279 (1984).
41 LAZARus, supra note 16, at 22-24.
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Clearly, the success of the AAA and similar organizations is
directly dependent upon laws enforcing such provisions.
C. Kodak Mining Co. v. Carts Fork Corp.: Judicial Declaration
of a New Policy
In Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp.,46 the Kentucky
Supreme Court announced that the common law rule prohibiting
the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes was
no longer viable and would no longer be applied in future
contract disputes.47 This major policy statement was made while
reversing a Kentucky Court of Appeals order affirming a trial
court's refusal to enforce a contractual arbitration provision.
Kodak Mining was an action by Carrs Fork Corporation, a
lessor under two long-term coal mining leases, against Kodak,
its lessee. Carrs Fork wanted the leases "cancelled, revoked and
forfeited" after Kodak allegedly failed to develop the leased
property in accordance with the parties' agreement and to mine
in conformity with applicable regulations. Kodak interposed a
defense based upon Carrs Fork's failure to submit the dispute
to arbitration in accordance with the broad-form arbitration
clauses contained in the leases. At a special hearing, the trial
judge rejected Kodak's arbitration defense and ordered the liti-
gation to proceed. The court of appeals denied Kodak's motion
for interlocutory relief, whereupon Kodak filed a motion re-
questing that the Kentucky Supreme Court vacate the court of
appeals' order and direct the trial court to stay proceedings
pending arbitration between the parties under the lease provi-
sions .
48
Justice Stephens' opinion for the Court commenced with a
discussion of preliminary matters involving arbitrability and ap-
plicable law. 49 He reasoned that because the leases were "con-
tracts evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce,"
the courts of the Commonwealth were required to apply the
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act to specifically enforce
- 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
47 Id. at 921.
"' Id. at 918.
4 Id. at 918-20.
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the parties' agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under each
of the leases. This obliged the courts to stay judicial proceedings
where the proceedings involved issues referable to arbitration.
Having concluded that the disputes between Carrs Fork and
Kodak were within the scope of the arbitration clauses, the Court
was thus required to vacate the Kentucky Court of Appeals'
order and direct the circuit court to stay the Carrs Fork action
pending arbitration."
Although the holding was expressly based on federal sub-
stantive law, the Court proceeded to address, arguendo, whether
the public policy of Kentucky would prevent enforcement of a
private arbitration agreement that did not fall under the provi-
sions of the Federal Arbitration Act.-" The dictum was in re-
sponse to arguments by the parties 5 2 and was intended as a
"clarification" of the Court's 1977 opinion in Fite and Warmath
Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp. 3
Fite involved disputes arising out of the construction of a
commercial shopping mall in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Fite, a
Tennessee contractor, signed a contract with MYS, a Kentucky
corporation wholly owned by New York residents, in which Fite
agreed to serve as general contractor in the construction of the
mall. The contract contained a detailed broad-form agreement
providing for arbitration of "all claims, disputes and other
matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this contract
or the breach thereof .... "54 When significant disputes arose
during the course of construction, the parties mutually agreed
to terminate their agreement. Subsequently, MYS sought to re-
solve the disputes through arbitration; Fite filed a complaint in
state court addressing the same controversies. The court subse-
quently ruled that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and
stayed judicial proceedings pending completion of arbitration.
The parties duly submitted the matter to arbitration; an award
was granted in favor of MYS and confirmed as a circuit court
11 Id. at 920.
I d. at 920-21.
52 Brief for Movant, at 13-18, 669 S.W.2d 917; Brief for Respondent, at 10-13,
669 S.W.2d 917.
53 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 731.
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judgment. Although the Kentucky Court upheld the award's
confirmation pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court
observed that it did not consider its decision to be contrary to
any "viable" public policy of the Commonwealth. 5 The Court
noted that the 1799 state constitution specifically approved ar-
bitration and that judicial opinions and legislative enactments
evinced a general policy in favor of resolving disputes by arbi-
tration. Nevertheless, stated the Court:
The spectre remains ... of the applicability of the common-
law rule which as a matter of judge-made law prohibits the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes based
on the questionable justification that such agreements "oust
the courts of jurisdiction." This rationale has not escaped
without serious criticism.
56
The Kentucky Court quoted the 1974 United States Supreme
Court opinion in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,7 in which an
agreement to arbitrate was likened to a forum selection clause
establishing the situs of the action as well as procedure to be
used in resolving the dispute.5 8 The Kentucky Court observed
that the invalidation of such agreements would allow not only
the repudiation of contractual promises but also would reflect
the out-dated concept that all disputes must be referred to formal
adjudication. Concluded the Court:
We are not concerned here with an adhesion contract or one
where the bargaining power of the parties is disparate. We
deal rather with an agreement voluntarily entered into by so-
phisticated and knowledgeable businessmen concerning a fi-
nancial transaction of considerable magnitude. In such situation,
we find no real support for the proposition that one of the
parties is free to repudiate his promise. We are convinced that
the application of federal law in this instance does not displace
a fundamental public policy of this state.59
" Id. at 734.
IS d. at 735.
417 U.S. 506 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
13 559 S.W.2d at 735.
5 Id.
1985-86]
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If the Court intended to consign the Kentucky "ouster of
jurisdiction" doctrine to oblivion, the Fite decision might have
been more explicit. In arguing for the application of Kentucky
law in Kodak, counsel for Carrs Fork maintained that the Court's
disapproval of the doctrine in Fite was limited to the particular
circumstances of that caseA° However, the Court's response
made plain what had been strongly inferred in the earlier deci-
sion:
Kentucky has no public policy that would prevent the enforce-
ment of a private arbitration agreement in contract cases where
the Federal Arbitration Act or comparable legislation might
apply. Assuming, arguendo, that the Federal Act did not ap-
ply, we reassert that the common law rule against arbitration
is no longer viable and what is commonly referred to as
Kentucky's "ouster of jurisdiction" doctrine is no longer ap-
plicable in future contract dispute situations like that in the
case at bar.6'
Thus, the Commonwealth's highest Court formally expunged
the "oft-criticized, non-constitutionally mandated, judge-made
... doctrine which has heretofore prevented the private arbitra-
tion of future contract disputes." '6 2 Upon the heels of this judi-
cial declaration of policy, the Kentucky legislature enacted a
comprehensive, modern arbitration act making agreements to
arbitrate future disputes "valid, enforceable and irrevocable. 6 3
D. The Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act
Despite the fact that arbitration was first acknowledged by
Kentucky statutes almost two hundred years ago,64 the legislature
only recently made contractual agreements to arbitrate future
disputes enforceable.6 5 Besides accomplishing this important goal,
Kentucky's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act radically
60 Brief for Respondent, at 10-11, 669 S.W.2d 917.
61 669 S.W.2d at 921.
62 Id.
63 1984 Ky. Acts 278.
6" Goldman, supra note 11, at 203-04.
63 Survey-Remedies, supra note 2, at 665.
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improved the entire statutory framework for arbitration and
award.
The previous arbitration statute, passed in 1942, was less an
effort at modern reform than a casual lumping-together of two
separate statutory procedures: one focusing on judicial submis-
sions of disputes to arbitration and another providing for sub-
mission of existing disputes by agreement of the parties.6 6 The
result was an incomplete and ambiguous patchwork that may
have been more of a roadblock to arbitration than an encour-
agement to its development. Later amendments to the statute
failed to eliminate numerous redundancies and internal conflicts
in the statute, or to incorporate many of the significant positive
features of contemporary federal and state enactments. The sub-
stantial improvements brought about by the passage of the Ken-
tucky Uniform Arbitration Act and the repeal of the 1942 Act
become evident from a brief comparison of the statutes.6 7
First, there are salient differences in the scope provisions of
the two statutes. The 1942 Act covered only agreements to
arbitrate controversies that "might be the subject of an ac-
tion"; 68 such language may be interpreted to mean that arbitra-
tors may only consider controversies of a justiciable nature.
6 9
Consistent with the general tendency in modern statutes, 70 the
Uniform Act contains no such limitation on the types of claims
and controversies that arbitrators may entertain. 7' Thus, the
mere fact that a court might refuse to hear a particular request
for relief should have no bearing on the issue's arbitrability.
The most glaring deficiency of the 1942 statute was its failure
to validate and enforce written agreements to arbitrate future
disputes between the parties. Instead, the statute provided that
Goldman, supra note 11, at 204.
" Id.
KRS § 417.010 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
, Similar language in the previous New York arbitration statute formed the basis
for a court's refusal to enforce the provision authorizing arbitrators to assess penalties
for breach of contract. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Savin Bros., Inc., 356
N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (interpreting the holding of Publishers' Ass'n. v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952)), aff'd, 373 N.Y.S.2d
555 (N.Y. 1975).
DOMKE, supra note 1, § 12.02, at 157.
KRS § 417.050 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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"[t]he agreement of submission shall be binding on the parties
thereto if it states the matter submitted,''72 which by implication
required that the subject of submission be an existing contro-
versy. Likewise, the agreement of submission had to identify the
arbitrators who were to hear the dispute.73 Unless the parties
were remarkably clairvoyant about the types of disputes that
might arise in the course of performance, and were willing to
commit themselves to a choice of arbitrators at the time of
contracting, there was no way that an arbitration clause covering
prospective disputes could be written to fulfill those statutory
requirements. 74 Kentucky's Uniform Act dispenses with such
qualifications and provides that arbitration agreements are "valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '75
Another significant flaw in the 1942 Act was its failure to
provide specific procedures for compelling an unwilling party to
arbitrate. 76 Similarly, the 1942 statute established no procedural
guidelines for dealing with court actions resulting from a con-
troversy covered by a valid arbitration agreement.7 7 Under the
previous statutory language, the absence of such directives left
to the parties and the courts the choice of techniques for avoid-
ing concurrent or conflicting hearings. The Uniform Act corrects
these deficiencies by requiring a judicial order compelling arbi-
tration upon a showing that a party has refused to arbitrate
pursuant to the terms of a valid agreement.7 8 Likewise, the
Uniform Act requires the court to stay "[a]ny action or pro-
ceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration ... if an order
for arbitration or an application therefore has been made .... ,,79
The previous statute also contained conflicting provisions
regarding issuance of subpoenas by arbitrators. Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes (KRS) section 417.013 provided that arbitrators
should have the power to issue subpoenas for the attendance of
- Id. § 417.010 (1970).
73 Id.
7, Survey-Remedies, supra note 2, at 668-69.
11 KRS § 417.050 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
76 Goldman, supra note 11, at 208.
77 Id. at 214.
18 KRS § 417.060(1).
Id. § 417.060(4).
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witnesses "to which all sheriffs and other like officers shall give
obedience." 0 Witnesses who failed to attend arbitration at the
designated time and place were subject to judicial punishment.
However, KRS section 417.030 provided that the arbitrators
might "summon witnesses and compel their attendance and pun-
ish for contempt by fine or imprisonment as justices of the peace
may do,"'" a provision of questionable constitutionality. 82 In
contrast, the Uniform Act empowers arbitrators to issue "sub-
poenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production
of books, records, documents and other evidence." 3 The pro-
vision further states:
Subpoenas so issued shall be served, and upon application to
the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced, in the manner
provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas
in a civil action.... All provisions of law compelling a person
under subpoena to testify are applicable.84
Where witnesses cannot be subpoenaed or are unable to attend
arbitration hearings, the Uniform Act provides that upon appli-
cation of a party, the arbitrator may permit the witness to be
deposed.85
Another concern with the previous Kentucky arbitration stat-
ute related to provisions for judicial review of arbitration awards.
KRS section 417.018 provided that "courts shall have power
over awards on equitable principles as heretofore. '8 6 Although
the proper scope of judicial review has been the subject of
considerable debate, most modern statutes and judicial decisions
adhere to the common law rule that an arbitrator's judgment
will not be set aside for mere errors of law or fact, and that an
arbitrator's award will be vacated only if there is clear and
convincing evidence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption in the
I' ld. § 417.013 (1970).
Id. § 417.030.
Goldman, supra note 11, at 205 (The constitutionality of the previous KRS §
417.030 is doubtful because the exercise of the contempt power is a judicial function.).
" KRS § 417.110(l) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
- Id. § 417.110(1), (3).
Id. § 417.110(2).
'" Id. § 417.018 (1970).
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arbitration proceedings . 7 The 1942 statute has been interpreted
as consistent with these common law principles.8 s Nevertheless,
the language of the Uniform Act offers a more straightforward
description of the permissible grounds for and limits to judicial
review of arbitral awards.8 9 Under the Uniform Act, grounds
for vacation include: corruption or fraud in the procurement of
the award, prejudicial arbitrator misconduct, action by the ar-
bitrators in excess of their power, prejudicial refusal by an
arbitrator to hear material evidence or to postpone a hearing
upon a showing of sufficient cause, and the lack of a valid
arbitration agreement. 90 However, the Act states that "the fact
that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing
to confirm the award."
9'
In adopting the Uniform Act, the Kentucky legislature made
two significant exceptions to its application. As enacted, the Act
"does not apply to arbitration agreements between employers
and employees or between their representatives and does not
apply to insurance contracts." 92 Thus, parties to personal em-
ployment contracts cannot avail themselves of the new Kentucky
statute. Likewise, arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements will not be enforced pursuant to the Act. While a
significant portion of agreements between labor and management
undoubtedly fall under the provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act 9a and other federal labor laws, the absence of a
See, e.g., Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co., 618 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. 1981) (arbitration
award may be set aside if there has been "gross mistake of law or fact constituting
evidence of misconduct amounting to fraud or undue partiality"); First Baptist Church
v. Hall, 246 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1952) (where court-appointed arbitration council performed
in substantial compliance with motion and agreement, there was no right to have dispute
reheard by court or a different board of arbitrators).
11 See generally Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 253 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1952)
(KRS § 417.040 applied to avoid setting aside arbitrator's award where there had been
no gross mistake of law or fact).
KRS § 417.160 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
90 Id.
9, Id. § 417.160(I)(e).
92 Id. § 417.050. The Kentucky "No-Fault" Insurance Act created the Kentucky
Insurance Arbitration Association as a forum for resolution of disputes between motor
vehicle insurance carriers. Id. § 304.39-290.
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
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generally applicable federal labor arbitration statute often neces-
sitates using state law as a guide in the development of federal
labor arbitration principles. 94 Under the circumstances, it is un-
clear what Kentucky law may be drawn upon to resolve proce-
dural issues.
Moreover, Kentucky's version of the Uniform Act applies
only to arbitration agreements entered into subsequent to its
effective date of July 13, 1984. 9s Presumably, agreements that
predate the Act will be subject either to the previous statute
governing arbitration and award or to the common law of ar-
bitration. The 1942 Act is apparently limited to arbitration agree-
ments relating to existing controversies.96 Under the declaration
of policy in Fite & Warmath and Kodak Mining, however,
Kentucky courts are apparently bound to uphold and enforce,
as a matter of common law, contractual agreements to arbitrate
future disputes that were entered into prior to the effective date
of the Uniform Act.
97
Despite its limitations, the Uniform Act represents a signif-
icant improvement in Kentucky arbitration law. Moreover, in
adopting the Act the Kentucky legislature has expressly espoused
the goal of making uniform the arbitration law of those states
that adopt the Act. 93 The result for Kentucky and other juris-
dictions should be a reduction in conflict of law issues.
E. Other Recent Developments in Kentucky Arbitration Law
During the survey period,99 Bartelt Aviation, Inc. v. Dry
Lake Coal Co. was the only other appellate court opinion con-
sidering Kentucky arbitration law.O'°Bartelt concerned the intent
of signatories to a sales contract regarding the forum for reso-
lution of contract disputes.
Bartelt Aviation and Dry Lake Company contracted for the
sale of an airplane. When a dispute arose, the issue was sub-
' Goldman, supra note 11, at 218.
KRS § 417.230.
See notes 18-28 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 46-63 supra and accompanying text.
KRS § 417.240.
a The survey period runs from July, 1984, to July, 1985.
682 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
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mitted to arbitration and an award was rendered in favor of
Bartelt. However, when Bartelt brought an action in circuit court
to enforce the arbitration award, the court dismissed the action
because the contractual arbitration provision "was unenforceable
because it was not conspicuously incorporated by reference in
the main body of the contract."'' °
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed after an extensive
review of the contract and applicable judicial precedent. 02 The
court observed that the contract form prepared by Bartelt con-
sisted of writing on two sides of a single sheet. The basic
agreement on the front page of the document provided that the
contract was "subject to the terms set forth below and of the
terms, conditions, warranties and limitations of liability printed
on the reverse side of this Purchase Order."'0 3 The signatures
of the parties followed. At the bottom of the front page, there
was an additional reference in bold print to certain "terms and
conditions on the reverse side" which were stated to be incor-
porated in the contract by reference. Among the various terms
set forth on the reverse side of the document was a clause
providing for arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to" the contract or its breach. The court noted
that although parties are not bound by material that appears
below their signature, the doctrine of incorporation by reference
is an exception to this general rule. ,4
The court declined to decide whether the arbitration clause
and the language of reference by which it was incorporated into
the parties' contract needed to be conspicuous. The court ob-
served that as long as the terms and conditions of which the
arbitration clause was a part were referred to by language above
a contracting party's signature, there was apparently "no case
law or statutes which require[d] that the incorporation language
for the arbitration provisions be stated in bold type or in any
unusual form." ° In any event, concluded the court, the incor-
porating language in the subject contract was "conspicuous" as
,01 Id. at 797.
,01 Id. at 796.
M Id. at 797.
'" Id.
101 Id. at 798.
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defined by the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code. It was
inconceivable to the court how anyone reading the contract could
fail to observe that the terms and conditions on the reverse side
of the single sheet were a part of the parties' agreement.'
°6
The court of appeals' decision is in line with the general
body of case authority dealing with boilerplate arbitration
clauses.'0 7 Where the reference to the arbitration clause and other
terms and conditions is in clear type, and in plain and direct
language commits the other party to their acceptance, the arbi-
tration clause becomes an integral part of the agreement. 03 On
the other hand, where no mention of the clause, or of terms
and conditions generally, is included in the language that pre-
cedes the signature, the clause will be held unenforceable.'0 9 The
usual test is whether a reasonable person would have been aware
of the clause under the circumstances, not whether the person
signing the contract was actually and subjectively aware of the
arbitration clause's presence." 0
II. ARBITRATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW: A BROAD MANDATE
In recent years, Chief Justice Burger and other members of
the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly gone on record
in favor of binding arbitration as an alternative to formal ad-
judication, reflecting concerns regarding the courts' inability to
cope with the mounting burden of litigation."' In the last two
years, the Court has given teeth to these admonitions by ex-
pressly recognizing the Federal Arbitration Act" 2 as a source of
substantive federal law applicable in state as well as federal
courts, and by giving new significance to the broad legislative
policy, expressed in the Federal Act, of enforcing arbitration
agreements."1
3
" Id.
' DomE, supra note 1, § 5.04, at 65-68.
'' 682 S.W.2d at 797-98.
' Id.
I" d. at 798.
See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982);
Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 1, 3 (1977).
-1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
"' See notes 114-69 infra and accompanying text.
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A. The Federal Arbitration Act as a Source of
Substantive Law
Since 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act has played a major
role in the enforcement of contractual arbitration agreements."
4
Contemporary writings indicate that the Federal Act was origi-
nally interpreted as a set of rules applicable to the federal
courts ." 5 However, the Federal Act has gradually achieved wider
significance.
The 1938 United States Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins," 6 which established the rule that federal courts
must apply state substantive lav in diversity cases," 7 raised
questions regarding the proper construction of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act. Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills' Is was among the
first cases to consider the status of the Federal Act under the
Erie doctrine. The case involved disputes between a Kentucky
corporation and a New York fiber broker under a contract for
shipments of fiber from South America. The defendant claimed
that the broad-form clause providing for arbitration of disputes
arising under or relating to the contract was invalid and unen-
forceable under Kentucky Law."19 In rejecting the defendant's
argument, the federal district court observed that under Con-
gress' plenary power to regulate commerce "among the several
states or with foreign nations,"' 20 the Federal Act had declared
"as a matter of [federal] substantive law, that an arbitration
agreement such as that ... in question, [was] valid and enforce-
able. '"' 2' The court concluded that under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, the power of Congress to
1,4 F. KELLOR, supra note 12, at 13.
"I H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); Cohen & Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 275-78 (1926) (statute rests solely upon
Congress' power to determine jurisdiction and duties of federal courts).
1.6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"' Id. at 78.
65 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946).
,,9 Id. at 603.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65 F. Supp. at 603 (citing Donahue v. Subsequehana [sic] Collieries, 138 F.2d
3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943)).
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regulate such commerce under federal law was paramount, and
preempted conflicting state laws.1
2 2
The issue was still undecided at the time of American Airlines
Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Air Board.2 3 In that
case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
Federal Arbitration Act was based upon Congress' power over
commerce, 2 4 and that in passing the Act Congress intended "to
overrule by legislation long-standing judicial precedent, which
declared agreements to submit judiciable controversies to arbi-
tration contrary to public policy, on the ground that enforcement
of such agreements would oust the courts of their jurisdic-
tion." 25 The same year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reached a similar conclusion in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Dev-
onshire Fabrics.2 6 In that case, the court held, contrary to
common law precedents, 2 7 that a claim of fraud in the induce-
ment to contract was arbitrable under federal law. 28 In reaching
this conclusion, the court drew upon what it described as a body
of "national substantive law" created by the Federal Arbitration
Act "that ... encompasses questions of interpretation and con-
struction as well as questions of validity, revocability and en-
forceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate
commerce or maritime affairs.'
'129
The Robert Lawrence Co. rationale formed the basis of the
United States Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg.1'0 The Supreme Court also
considered whether a claim of fraud in the inducement to con-
tract generally-as opposed to the arbitration clause itself-was
for the arbitrators or for the courts.' 3' Relying heavily upon
1 Id. at 603 ("The power of Congress to regulate such commerce by National
laws is paramount and the conflicting laws of a state cannot stand in the way of
enforcement.").
"1 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959).
04 Id. at 815.
Id. at 816.
'" 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed,
364 U.S. 801 (1960).
2' Id. at 405. See also notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 409.
388 U.S. 395, 399 (1967).
' Id. at 402-04.
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Robert Lawrence Co., and over a vigorous dissent authored by
Justice Black, 3 2 the Court reached the same conclusion as the
Second Circuit, but upon the basis of Congress' power to "pre-
scribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect
to subject matter over which Congress plainly has the power to
legislate"' 33 and not as a matter of substantive national law.
Although Prima Paint Corp. clearly established that the
Federal Arbitration Act's provisions were to be applied by fed-
eral courts in diversity cases, the Court's reluctance to enunciate
a rule based upon substantive federal law left unresolved the
issue of the Act's applicability in state courts. Kentucky and the
great majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue
have relied upon the Federal Act's provisions in transactions
within the scope of that statute.3 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court
confronted the question in Fite and Warmath Constr. Co. v.
MYS Corp.'35 in which the appeal from an arbitration award
was based in part upon the inapplicability of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act in state court actions. The petitioner argued that
Kentucky law should be applied to render the disputants' agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes invalid and unenforceable.
3 6
In affirming the circuit court's confirmation of the arbitra-
tion award, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the
parties' contract "contemplated a transaction involving interstate
commerce"' 3 7 within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act.
After briefly exploring the Act's history and purposes, the Court
accepted "the inevitable conclusion that the United States Ar-
bitration Act has to be applied in state courts as well as in the
federal courts- where the suit involves a contract evidencing a
transaction in interstate commerce regardless of the forum in
which it is brought."' 3 s A contrary holding would frustrate the
Erie goal of preventing forum-shopping. Concluded the Court,
"this rationale would apply even if the Supremacy Clause did
M, Id. at 407.
" Id. at 405.
'4 Survey-Remedies, supra note 2, at 665, 682-85.
" 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
I Id. at 732.
Id. at 732-33.
Id. at 733.
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not require it to conform to and apply provisions of the Federal
statute."13 9
Recently, the United States Supreme Court specifically ad-
dressed the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act is
applicable in state courts. In Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp. '140 the Court considered the arbitrability of certain
disputes between a North Carolina owner and an Alabama con-
tractor relating to a hospital construction contract. The contrac-
tor had submitted claims to the owner for additional costs
allegedly resulting from job delays. The owner filed suit against
the contractor and the project architect in a North Carolina
court seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the con-
tractor had no right to arbitrate under a provision in its contract
with the owner.' 41 The contractor then filed a diversity suit in
federal court seeking an order to compel arbitration of the claims
and disputes between it and the owner pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act. The federal court stayed the contractor's action
pending resolution of the state court suit because the two actions
were both considering the issue of arbitrability of the contrac-
tor's claims. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's stay order and remanded the cause with instruc-
tions to enter an order to arbitrate. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, affirmed the Fourth Circuit deci-
sion. 42 The Court confronted the argument that the presence of
multiple parties, all of whom were not subject to arbitration,
would lead to piecemeal resolution of the dispute if the arbitra-
tion agreement were enforced. The Court emphasized that the
Federal Arbitration Act required that "an arbitration agreement
must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons
who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitra-
tion agreement.'" 14 Focusing on the basic issue of arbitrability
of the disputes between the contractor and hospital, the Court
reviewed the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments under section 2 of the Act,' 44 which it said created a
'"Id.
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
141 Id. at 6.
"I Id. at 19.
1'4 Id. at 20.
1- 9 US.C. § 2 (1982).
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"substantive law of arbitrability"' 45 applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the statute. Under federal law,
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues were to be
resolved in favor of arbitration, including issues relating to
contract interpretation or defenses to arbitrability such as waiver,
delay and the like. 46 Having explicitly recognized under the Act
a body of federal arbitration law preemptive of contrary state
substantive or procedural policies, the Court announced that
state courts as well as federal courts were obliged to grant stays
of litigation in favor of arbitration as required by the Federal
Act.
47
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 48 the Court addressed the
arbitrability of a cause of action brought pursuant to a state
statute that required judicial consideration of claims. The case
involved actions by Southland Corporation and other conven-
ience store franchisees against their franchisor, alleging, inter
alia, fraud, breach of contract, and violation of the disclosure
requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law. 49 Pur-
suant to the broad-form arbitration clause in the franchise agree-
ments, the trial court ordered arbitration of all claims except
those based on the statute. An appellate court reversed the
holding regarding the statutory claim. The California Supreme
Court, however, held that the statutory claims were not arbitra-
ble, interpreting the Franchise Investment Act to require judi-
cial consideration of claims brought under its terms. Southland
Corporation appealed the state court decision to the United
States Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger's opinion reaffirmed
the national policy favoring arbitration, which the Court said
"withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum
for resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration."' 50 The Court could discern only two
limitations on arbitration provisions' enforceability under the
Federal Arbitration Act: (1) such provisions must be included
'" 460 U.S. at 24.
" Id. at 24-25.
,' Id. at 26.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
" Id. at 4.
,o Id. at 10.
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"in a written maritime contract or a contract 'evidencing a
transaction involving commerce' " and (2) such clauses must be
revocable upon such "grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.' 5' According to the Court, the
Act's broad principle of enforceability allowed no further limi-
tations under state law. 52 In creating a body of substantive law
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended
to foreclose state attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.' 53 Thus, as interpreted, the California
Franchise Investment Law was violative of the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.
5 4
Most recently, the Southland Corp. rationale was extended
to actions under a state securities act. Under the doctrine of
Wilko v. Swan, 155 the courts had long recognized that predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 were not enforceable, 5 6 a significant
exception to the broad policy in favor of arbitrability. In Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 57 the Court considered whether,
when a complaint raises non-arbitrable federal securities claims
as well as pendent state claims, a federal court may deny a
motion to compel arbitration of the state law claims in the face
of a contractual provision calling for arbitration.5 8 The trial
court denied a motion that the state claims be arbitrated, and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court reversed in a unanimous opinion.'5 9 It held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act requires federal district courts to compel
arbitration of pendent arbitrable state claims when requested to
do so by one of the parties, even where the result might be
"inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different
forums."'160 The Court reiterated that the Federal Act's primary
"I Id. at 10-11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)).
2 d. at 11.
Id. at 16.
1!4 Id.
"' 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
"' Id. at 438.
"' 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
',' Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1241.
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purpose was to ensure judicial enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, not to promote expeditious resolution of claims. Absent
some "countervailing policy manifested in another federal stat-
ute," the policy in favor of enforcement must prevail.' 61
The most recent United States Supreme Court case address-
ing the conflict between broad national policies favoring arbitra-
tion under federal statutes and contrary state law is Allis-Chalmers
v. Lueck, 162 In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court underlined
the difficulties inherent in drawing artificial boundaries limiting
arbitration claims and disputes to those sounding in contract. 6
Allis-Chalmers involved a union member's contention that his
employer and the insurer had handled in bad faith a claim under
a disability plan included in the collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the union. 64 Rather than utilizing the
contract provisions requiring arbitration of grievances, the plain-
tiff filed a complaint in state court alleging that his insurance
claim was handled in bad faith and seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. The plaintiff appealed from a summary judg-
ment for the defendant based upon the applicability of section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the plaintiff had stated
a tort claim of bad faith, which under Wisconsin law was
distinguishable from bad-faith breach of contract and not gov-
erned by applicable federal labor law or contract-based grievance
procedures. 65 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, concluding in part that because the asserted right not
only derived from the contract but was defined by the contrac-
tual obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability
inevitably would involve contract interpretation and, thus, the
complaint should have been dismissed for failure to utilize the
grievance procedure spelled out in the contract, including arbi-
tration. 66 Although the case dealt primarily with federal con-
cerns in the labor sphere, the Court's rationale may be equally
'" Id. at 1243.
162 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
161 Id. at 1915-16.
'64 Id. at 1908-09.
161 Id. at 1912-13.
'1 Id. at 1915-16.
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pertinent to arbitrability questions arising in other contractual
contexts under the Federal Arbitration Act. 67 In addressing the
potential harm resulting from allowing a claimant to bring a
claim directly in state court without first exhausting alternative
procedures, including arbitration, the Court reasoned that since
practically any alleged willful breach of contract could be re-
stated as a tort claim for breach of good-faith obligation under
a contract, the arbitrator's role could be bypassed easily, result-
ing in arbitration losing most of its effectiveness.1e Moreover,
such a result would "eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-
contract law [and federal arbitration law in general?] ... that
it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to
interpret the ... contract in the first instance.' ' 69
The Court's liberal applications of federal arbitration law
may have a far-reaching impact. Where federal law applies, it
must be enforced by state courts as well as federal courts.
Arbitration clauses will be broadly enforced, and claims and
controversies will be submitted to arbitration unless the contract-
ing parties have clearly expressed a contrary intent in their
agreement. Moreover, enforcement is compelled even if the pres-
ence of other parties or of non-arbitrable issues requires multiple
proceedings. Finally, this federal mandate may be limited only
by Congress.
B. Other Recent Cases Under Federal Arbitration Law
1. State Court Decisions
Within the survey period, two Kentucky court decisions,
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp. 70 and Atlantic Painting
& Contracting, Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 71 continued to
"flesh out" federal substantive law under the United States
Arbitration Act.
167 See generally M. HiLs & A. SnmcRopi, supra note 42, at 4-5 (case precedents
relating to labor arbitration are frequently cited as authority in commercial arbitration
cases).
16 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
Id. at 1916.
"r 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984). See also Brief for Respondent, Kodak Mining Co.
v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
7 670 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1984).
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As previously discussed, 72 Kodak Mining Co. involved dis-
putes between a Kentucky lessee and a Virginia lessor under two
coal mining leases. 7 1 When Carrs Fork, the lessor, filed suit in
circuit court alleging breach of contract by lessee Kodak, the
latter interposed a defense based upon the contractual arbitration
clauses. On interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's denial of
Kodak's arbitration defense, the Kentucky Supreme Court con-
sidered a number of arguments put forth by Carrs Fork in an
effort to avoid enforcement of the arbitration clause. 74
The Court first addressed Carrs Fork's argument that arbi-
tration was inappropriate because the lessor sought revocation
or cancellation of the entire contract. Carrs Fork cited a Florida
appellate court case for the proposition that arbitration clauses
are not applicable to controversies relating to the validity of the
underlying contract. The Kentucky Court rejected Carrs Fork's
argument because the issue in Kodak Mining Co. was not the
validity of the entire contract, but rather the performance or
nonperformance of certain contract terms by Kodak, questions
clearly submissible to arbitration under the parties' agreement. 75
Although the result reached by the Court is consistent with
the Federal Arbitration Act's purposes and goals, it is unclear
why the Court did not specifically address this scope issue as
one of federal substantive law under the Federal Act since that
Act was deemed to apply. 76 Had the Court done so, it might
have availed itself of a significant body of case precedent holding
that questions relating to the validity of the parties' contract are
for the arbitrator. 77 For example, the United States Supreme
Court decision in Prima Paint Corp.178 dealt with a request for
revocation based upon alleged fraud in the inducement to con-
tract. 179 Under traditional contract law, such fraud would render
172 See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
" 669 S.W.2d at 918.
7 Id. at 919-21.
I Id. at 918-19.
176 Id. at 919-20.
'1 DoMKE, supra note 1, § 12.02, at 157. See, e.g., Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v.
Larmor Corp., 468 A.2d 91 (Md. 1983).
171 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395.
79 See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
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the contract voidable.'8 0 Nevertheless, Prima Paint Corp. stands
for the principle that because arbitration clauses "are separable
from the contracts in which they are embedded,"' 8 a broad
arbitration clause encompasses arbitration of the claim that the
contract itself was induced by fraud and therefore subject to
rescission.'82 Likewise, the mere fact that a promisor's alleged
breach is so material as to give rise to a right of revocation in
the promisee should not invalidate an otherwise enforceable
arbitration clause.'
8 3
The Court next considered Carrs Fork's argument that the
leases in question did not evidence a transaction in interstate
commerce as defined by the Federal Arbitration Act. 184 Carrs
Fork contended that the leases in question involved a sale of
real estate within a single Kentucky county and not the sale or
shipment of coal interstate or even intrastate.'8 5 In response, the
Court considered various aspects of the transaction and con-
cluded that the contracts did evidence a transaction involving
interstate commerce.' 86 First, said the Court, the contracting
parties were from different states. Second, the arbitration clause
itself provided that the selection of an arbitration board was to
be made by federal judges from different states. Third, the
leases' prime purposes related to mining activity, an area exten-
sively regulated by the federal government. 8 7 "Even coal mined
and sold entirely intrastate is still considered to be in interstate
commerce because the production and sale of coal on a local
basis affects the supply and price of coal in the interstate mar-
ket."' 88 Thus, concluded the Court, coal leases were "contracts
evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce."' 8 9 The
Court's reasoning is consistent with the trend in state courts to
broadly interpret the application of the Federal Arbitration Act.' 90
'" 388 U.S. at 402.
I81 d.
, ' Id. at 403-04.
' Id. at 402.
,u 669 S.W.2d at 919-20.
I' d. at 919.
' Id. at 920.
", Id. at 919-20.
'I Id. at 920.
' Id.
" Do uKE, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 37-38.
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Finally, the Court addressed Carrs Fork's contention that
Kodak waived its right to arbitration by appearing in court to
interpose the arbitration defense.'91 Although the Court gave
little explanation for its rejection of this argument, the result
again appears to be consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act's
policies and goals. Generally spealing, waiver of a party's right
to arbitration depends upon whether, under the circumstances,
the party's actions indicate an intent to abandon the right to
seek arbitration.' 92 Although participation in an adjudication
may be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate and therefore a waiver of a contractual arbitration
provision, it has never been held that the right to arbitrate is
waived by the mere filing of an answer that asserts that very
right.' 93
Atlantic Painting & Contracting, Inc. v. Nashville Bridge
Co. 194 involved disputes between a painting subcontractor and a
prime contractor relating to construction of the superstructure
of the 1-24 bridge across the Ohio River between Kentucky and
Illinois. 95 Atlantic/Buckeye, a joint venture, contracted with
Nashville Bridge Company to paint the bridge's superstructure.
Sometime after the work commenced, the project was delayed.
In December, 1972, Atlantic/Buckeye notified Nashville Bridge
Company that it would seek compensation for delay-related
expenses. Upon completion of the job, Atlantic/Buckeye sub-
mitted notice of its claim and, upon receiving no response from
the prime contractor, demanded arbitration. After negotiating,
the parties sent a letter to the American Arbitration Association
seeking arbitration of a single question: namely, whether the
subcontractor's claim for escalated costs of labor and materials
resulting from construction delays was subject to arbitration.9 6
After receiving briefs from each of the parties, the duly-ap-
pointed arbitrator entered an award to the effect that the claim
19, 669 S.W.2d at 921.
192 Id.
"I See, e.g., H.M. Hamilton & Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 251 N.Y.S.2d
215 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 255 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. 1964). See also Dozxm, supra
note 1, § 19.01, at 277.
'1 670 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1984).
,91 Id. at 842.
1 Id. at 843.
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was not "subject to arbitration."'' 97 The arbitrator's decision
stated that the award's basis was the failure of Atlantic/Buckeye
to give timely notice of the delay to the prime contractor as
required by the contract. 98 Atlantic/Buckeye subsequently filed
suit in circuit court. Shortly before trial, Nashville Bridge Com-
pany moved for summary judgment on grounds that the arbi-
trator's award was a bar to the circuit court action. The trial
court proceeded to try the case on its merits without ruling on
the motion for summary judgment. The trial ended with an
award of damages against Nashville Bridge Company, and the
prime contractor appealed the decision. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court judgment on the issue of de-
lay damages, holding that the arbitrator's earlier award in favor
of Nashville Bridge Company was final and binding on the
parties. 199
In a unanimous opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeal's determination. 200 The Court noted
that, although judicial review of arbitral awards must not involve
the court's substituting its own judgment for that of the arbitra-
tor, the reviewing tribunal had the authority to determine whether
the award was within the scope of the submission and not
fraudulent.2 0' Here, said the Court, the essence of the arbitrator's
award was to recognize a right to collect delay damages; in this
respect, the arbitrator decided the arbitrability issue in favor of
Atlantic/Buckeye. 20 2 Nevertheless, the arbitrator concluded that
the right to recovery was cut off by the claimant's failure to
comply with the contract's notice provisions. 20 3 In so deciding,
the arbitrator failed to take account of the December, 1972,
notification by Atlantic/Buckeye and, more importantly, "went
beyond the issue submitted to make a factual determination of
a potential defense to the claim of 'escalated costs of labor and
materials resulting from construction delays.' "24 Because the
1 ' Id.
%' 3 Id.
19 Id.
2m Id. at 847.
Id. at 843.
I d. at 844.
:' Id.
=0 Id. at 845.
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arbitrator's decision on the notification issue was beyond the
scope of his authority under the parties' submission, it was "void
and not binding on the courts or anybody else.
'205
In reaching this conclusion, the Kentucky Supreme Court
was mindful of the severe limitations placed upon a court of
review in considering appeals from arbitration awards. 206 In this
case, however, the Court properly overturned the award because
it was evident from the face of the award that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers.
20 7
The Court also considered a motion to vacate its own order
granting discretionary review. The motion contended that Atlan-
tic/Buckeye failed to move for vacation of the original arbitral
award within three months of its rendition in accordance with
the Federal Arbitration Act, which is applicable to the states
under the doctrine of Southland Corp. v. Keating.2 8 The Court
held that the three-month notice provision in section 12 of the
Federal Act applied only to motions in federal court to vacate
arbitration awards on specified grounds, and was not binding
on state courts. 09 While acknowledging that Southland Corp.,
Fite & Warmath Constr. Co., and other cases declared that the
Federal Act did express certain substantive policies that were
preemptive of state law, there was nothing in the Act "remotely
suggesting that the 'motion to vacate' procedure, including the
three months' time limitation set up for federal proceedings, has
any application at all to such state action. 2 10 The Court ob-
served that the Federal Arbitration Act is a source both of
substantive law and of procedure. However, noted the Court,
certain procedural aspects apply only to federal courts. 21'
2. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Cases
Two other opinions published during the survey period are
worthy of note.212 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals delivered
205 Id.
0 Id. at 845-46.
20 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1983) (A United States court may vacate an award "where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers.").
201 670 S.W.2d at 846-47.
10 Id. at 846.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 846. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
212 Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1985);
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both opinions regarding controversies between Island Creek Coal
Sales Company and the City of Gainesville, Florida, under a
long-term coal purchase agreement. The parties entered into a
contract under which Gainesville would buy coal from Island
Creek, to be supplied primarily from a mine known as "Holden
22." The price of coal declined after several years of perform-
ance, and in January, 1983, Gainesville sought to terminate its
contract with Island Creek.2 3 Gainesville filed an arbitration
demand with the American Arbitration Association (AAA), al-
leging various breaches of the agreement by Island Creek and
requesting an arbitral declaration of its right to terminate the
contract. In May, 1983, hearings were held before a three-
member arbitration panel. The panel requested posthearing briefs
from the parties prior to the rendition of a final award. Shortly
after the hearings, Gainesville announced its intention to termi-
nate the agreement. Island Creek submitted a written request to
the arbitrators to compel Gainesville to continue performing
under the contract until the arbitrators reached a decision re-
garding the city's right to terminate. Thereafter, the arbitration
panel issued an interim order directing Gainesville to "continue
performance of the contract ... by accepting shipments of coal
from ... [Island Creek] until further order of this panel.
' 214
Gainesville refused to accept and pay for the coal as directed by
the interim order and commenced an action in a Florida federal
district court to vacate the order. In its complaint, Gainesville
alleged fraud by Island Creek as well as violations of federal
and Florida anti-racketeering laws.
215
On the same day, Island Creek brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky, the district in which the arbitration was pending. Island
Creek sought judicial confirmation of the arbitrators' interim
order and a preliminary injunction against Gainesville's proceed-
ing with the vacation action. In late July, 1983, Island Creek
Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, City of Gainesville v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 54 USLW 3309 (Nov. 5,
1985).
233 729 F.2d at 1047.
2,, Id. at 1048.
235 Id. at 1046.
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was granted the relief it sought, and Gainesville immediately
appealed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. 216 In response to Gainesville's assertion that the ar-
bitrators exceeded their authority in rendering the award because
arbitrators did not have the power to grant interim equitable
relief, the court noted that the AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules, which were incorporated by reference in the parties' agree-
ment, explicitly provided that arbitrators could order specific
performance of a contract. 217 After reviewing case authority
supporting the proposition that arbitrators could award interim
injunctive relief, the court addressed Gainesville's argument that
the order was not final and therefore not subject to confirmation
under section 10(d) of the Federal Arbitration Act. Said the
court, "This argument overlooks the rule that an 'interim' award
that finally and definitively disposes of a separate independent
claim may be confirmed 'notwithstanding the absence of an
award that finally disposes of all the claims that were submitted
to arbitration.' ",218 Here, concluded the court, the interim award
disposed of a single self-contained issue, namely, "whether the
City is required to perform the contract during the pendency of
the arbitration proceedings. '219
The Sixth Circuit was also required to review other awards
by the same district court during the appeal of the judgment on
the original interim order 20 During that appeal, Island Creek
moved the district court to issue a contempt order against
Gainesville because Gainesville persistently refused to comply
with the court's order confirming the arbitrators' interim award. 22
In October, 1983, the court refused to hold Gainesville in con-
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1049. "The authority for equitable relief arises from Rule 43 of the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules which the Agreement incorporates by reference. Rule 43
provides that '[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which the arbitrator deems
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including but
not limited to, specific performance of the contract.' " Id. at 1048.
28 Id. at 1049 (quoting Eurolines Shipping Co. v. Metal Transp. Corp., 491 F.
Supp. 590, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), quoting Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Star
Lines, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
219 Id.
1 Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1985).
"I Id. at 439.
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tempt, but issued an opinion in which it found that Gainesville
was not in compliance with the court's judgment. Gainesville's
noncompliance stemmed from the city's refusal to accept nine
shipments of coal tendered to it from Island Creek's mines
between the date of the interim order and the date of the judicial
confirmation of that order. The district court ordered Gainesville
to enter into a "mutually agreeable time table" with Island
Creek to correct its noncompliance, and also ordered Gainesville
to "maintain the status quo" under its contract by "accepting
ten thousand tons of coal every eight days." 222 The court noted
that it was not altering or modifying the July 22, 1983, award,
but was simply clarifying the award to force Gainesville to do
what was required of it under the arbitrators' prior decision.
Gainesville unsuccessfully moved to vacate the district court's
October order and on December 1 the court ordered Gainesville's
compliance "under pain of contempt." 23 After more motion
practice, the court agreed in January, 1984, to stay its December
1, 1983, order pending the outcome of the first appeal. The stay
was conditioned, however, upon the posting of a large bond "to
secure [Gainesville's] performance" of the December order. 2 4
Gainesville then appealed the district court's orders of October,
December and January.
Gainesville contended that the specific requirements of the
district court's October order were in excess of the court's au-
thority under the Federal Arbitration Act because the court went
beyond enforcement of the arbitrators' interim award.2 The
Sixth Circuit observed that, as a general principle, the courts
did not have the power or authority to correct or modify arbi-
tration awards that were ambiguous or incomplete. Instead, the
correct procedure was to resubmit the award to the arbitrators
for clarification.2 6 However, noted the court, the Federal Ar-
bitration Act grants the federal courts the authority "to correct
or modify an award ... where the award is imperfect in matter
of form not affecting the merits of the controversy."' ' 7 In such
m Id.
M Id.
n4 Id.
=Id.
n6 Id.
2m Id. at 440.
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cases, the court may amend the award, "so as to effect the
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties." 228 In
this case, said the court, the arbitrators' order to "continue
performance of the contract . . by accepting shipments of
coal"2 29 seemed clear in intent. The district court's order that
Gainesville accept the missed shipments, receive future shipments
on a scheduled basis, and pay for all the coal it received was
"an effort merely to require that Gainesville perform as the
arbitrators had ordered it to. ' 230 In essence, reasoned the court
of appeals, the district court was simply giving content to the
arbitrators' order to "continue performance."2' The court set
aside that portion of the district court's ruling requiring that
Gainesville post a bond to satisfy its obligation, but ordered
Gainesville to pay promptly to Island Creek "an amount equal
to the minimum price it contends in good faith to be due for
the coal it has already received but not paid for under the
previous order of the arbitrators .... ,2 The court defended
its decision as "consistent with the policy and purpose of the
Arbitration Act to permit relatively quick and inexpensive reso-
lution of contractual disputes by avoiding the expense and delay
of extended court proceedings."' 3 The court stated, "The po-
sition advanced by Gainesville would require federal courts to
remand [to the arbitrators] for clarification or correction every
arbitration award disputed by one of the parties in the event it
is brought to federal court for confirmation and enforce-
ment. ' 2 4 This would make for a lengthy and expensive process
and be inconsistent with the policies and goals of the Federal
Arbitration Act. "Further, for an unsuccessful party to force a
successful adversary to resort to the federal courts for confir-
mation and/or interpretation of an extended contract arbitration
award, in the event of objections to every detail thereof, would
render a reasonable arbitration award ineffectual. ' 23
=- Id.
n29 Id.
23 Id.
23 Id.
132 Id. at 441.
233 Id.
2 Id.
235 Id.
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Island Creek is an illustration of the problems that can arise
as a result of the bifurcation of remedy-making and enforcement
powers in arbitration. While arbitrators have relatively wide
flexibility in rendering awards, their decision must be enforced
by a court. When the award is unclear, or unforeseen circum-
stances occur subsequent to the rendering of the award, a re-
viewing court is faced with the difficult choice of vacating the
award, modifying its terms or, if the timetable for rendition of
the award has not run, directing a rehearing by the arbitrators.
23 6
This task is made more difficult because commercial arbitrators
tend not to provide written rationale for the award.2 7 In Island
Creek, the district court's attempts to effect the apparent intent
of the arbitrators' award were frustrated by extended motion
practice, as were the arbitral goals of speed, economy, and
finality.
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1982).
21' AMERicAN ARBITRATION AssOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULE 41.
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